**Moral Judgment and Moral Motivation**

Source: Philosophy Dynamics

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Editor: Li Xiuwei

2019-07-09

<https://www.cssn.cn/zx/llyy/202210/t20221027_5555740_1.shtml>

**2. Practical Reason**

　　The biggest benefit of limiting the subject of judgment to those with practical rationality is that it can solve the phenomenon of various "immoral people" in daily life. Internalists can emphasize that only those with practical rationality can generate moral motivations while making moral judgments, and various types of "immoral people" (mentally abnormal people, profit maximizers, cowardly people, etc.) are not people with normal practical rationality, so they cannot constitute a challenge to "practical rationality internalism". Internalism is almost consistent with the tradition of "unity of knowledge and action" in Chinese philosophy, especially its advocacy of "practical rationality" and the view of "conscience and ability" in Xinxue. It should be said that this theory of interpreting the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation seems to be widely accepted in ancient and modern times, both at home and abroad. However, the most important task of analytical ethics is not only to put forward advocacy, but also to clarify concepts. For a concept like "practical rationality" that occupies a key position in internalism, it is impossible to satisfy the other party without in-depth discussion and criticism. So, what is practical rationality?

　　Internalists often interpret practical rationality through behavioral reasons. We can use the example of factual judgment to illustrate what is cognitive irrationality. Suppose you believe that the earth is square. In order to correct your cognitive bias, "I" shows you a lot of evidence, including not only the statements of authoritative scientists, but also photos of the earth taken by astronauts in outer space. In the face of so much evidence, you will have reason to believe that the earth is round, thus changing your original belief, then we will say that you are cognitively rational. On the contrary, if you still say "nevertheless, I still think the earth is square" in the face of so much evidence, then you are cognitively irrational because you have not formed a reasonable cognitive judgment. There are similar situations in the practical field. If you want to operate a microscope, "I" gives you a microscope operating guide, but you do not intend to accept it, but do your own thing, and end up hitting a wall everywhere, then this is practical irrationality because you do not do what you have reason to do. Similarly, if you make moral judgments or form moral beliefs when dealing with interpersonal relationships, but you have no motivation, are indifferent, or even act completely contrary to moral instructions, then you have not done what you have reason to do, and you are also morally irrational. Therefore, "practical rationality" is the ability of people to do what they have reason to do; if they do not do it, it is irrational. In general, there are at least three problems with this answer.

　　First, it seems to tell us that: on the one hand, according to the view of internalism, practically rational people will form moral motivations and even take relevant actions based on their moral judgments; on the other hand, so-called practically rational people will use moral judgments as reasons to form motivations and even take actual actions. In this way, it is difficult for it to escape the accusation of "begging for premises".

　　Second, the so-called "practical rationality" actually means that we do what we have reason to do in action, or at least have the intention to do what we have reason to do. Otherwise, it is irrational. But in real life, the problem is not that simple. In the above example, although "I" showed you a lot of evidence to make you believe that the earth is round, and even took out photos as direct evidence to try to change your mind, if you think that this is not a reason for you to change your mind, then insisting on your own opinion cannot be said to be irrational. For example, you may think that the photo is fake; or you are not an empiricist, and think that all empirical phenomena cannot effectively support beliefs, and only rational reasoning can undertake this task. In this case, you do not use the photo as a reason to change your belief, and still insist that "the earth is square", which cannot be considered irrational. In moral practice, the situation may be more complicated. Sometimes, although people sincerely advocate a moral judgment, they may think that this is not a reason for action, or it is not a very important or appropriate reason, so they do not form an intention to act, which does not show that they are irrational. (14) For example, although "I" believe that it is my duty to defend my country and go to the battlefield, for "I" staying at home to take care of my family can bring me more happiness. Therefore, in the balance of the two reasons, "I" choose the latter, which does not mean that "I" am irrational in practice. After all, "I" also have reasons for action. Sometimes the reasons provided by moral beliefs are completely wrong. For example, fanatical Christians in the Middle Ages believed that they should uphold God's authority and kill all kinds of "heretics". But if one of them, X, suddenly felt pity and finally did not use his moral beliefs as a reason to release the "prisoner", this certainly could not be considered irrational. This example shows that "when the moral judgment is wrong, there is no such requirement: to act according to the moral judgment, or to intend to act, or to intend to act" (15). Therefore, X's behavior does not mean irrationality in practice.

　　Third, this kind of "practical rationality" is actually a kind of "means/end" rationality. If "I"'s goal is to obtain true beliefs about the shape of the earth, then following the means of obtaining true beliefs - such as adopting various evidences as cognitive reasons - is cognitively rational. If "I"'s goal is to achieve observational success in practice, then intending to use the operating instructions as a reason for action is rational. Similarly, if "I"'s goal is Aristotle's self-realization, or utilitarianism's maximum utility, or Kant's so-called person himself, then when the behavior indicated by "I"'s moral judgment can become a means to achieve these goals, "I" will use it as a reason and even directly follow it, which is practically rational. Therefore, Christine M. Korsgaard believes that the model of means/end rationality can be used to explain the situation in practice: when you realize that the behavior is a means to achieve your goal, you are still not motivated to do such a thing, which is practical irrationality, and this is the best way to cater to internalism. (16) But this view has been questioned by Mason (Elinor Mason). She believes that Korsgaard's argument is actually this: if A is an end and B is a means, people believe that A is worth pursuing as an end, which gives rise to the motivation to pursue A; and since B is a means to achieve A, people with practical rationality will believe that "B should be done" and be motivated to do B. In other words, Korsgaard's means/end explanation of practical rationality is based on the belief that "A is worth pursuing" and the internalist view that it can motivate motivation, so if practical rationality is used to explain internalism, it is still begging for premises. (17)

　　In fact, any understanding of practical rationality should transcend the positions of internalism and externalism, which seems to be the consensus of many scholars. In other words, we need to give an independent explanation of "practical rationality" from another perspective, beyond the topic of "the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation", without presupposing whether moral judgment can produce moral motivation. The author believes that the understanding of "practical rationality" needs to be based on historical practice. We do not need to assume that there are any innate moral judgments about a certain purpose worth pursuing, but should focus on understanding how moral judgments themselves are generated and what their functions are. On this basis, we will understand that any person who is rational in practice can understand the functions of people's moral activities and moral judgments, and use moral judgments appropriately, otherwise he will be evaluated as "irrational" by a specific social community. In other words, whether practice in the moral field is rational is evaluated by whether it can participate in people's common moral life and realize the function of moral judgment.

　　MS Bedke tells us through his insightful discussion that people's moral activities are actually the result of human beings constantly adjusting their behavior to survive and adapt under the pressure of survival competition when facing natural selection. In general, morality is beneficial to others and the entire group (even to oneself while being altruistic), so that the entire race can stand out and gain an advantage in the competition. This moral life model has been passed down from ancestors to the entire social community through gene replication and inheritance, and has gradually become the basic behavior model of the entire social community. This is actually the process of continuous social evolution. (18) In this way, whether an individual is rational in moral life is not judged by himself, but should be evaluated based on his fit with the moral behavior model of the social community in which he lives. So, what is the moral behavior model of the social community? Bedke said that in order to stimulate moral behavior, we must have a certain psychological state, through which we can realize the function of transforming people's cognition of moral behavior into actual action, and this psychological state is to express the inner action intention by making moral judgments. (19) Therefore, we can say that in moral life, a person with practical rationality means that he follows the basic mode of using moral judgment in the social community, can realize the basic function of moral judgment, and always takes the interests of the social community as his goal (therefore, moral reasons such as "infidels should be killed" are not recognized in many social communities). At the same time, he also needs to effectively stimulate behavioral motivation. On this basis, it is possible to construct an internalist theory with practical rationality as the spiritual condition and a specific community as the social condition. (20)

　　Precisely because of this, we can criticize the "immoralists" proposed by externalism for making irrational mistakes without having to resort to the premise of internalism. But it is undeniable that this kind of internalism is likely to bring us hidden worries: it limits moral life and moral judgment to a specific social community. The common sense of internalism - moral judgment can trigger moral motivation - will only be effective in a specific social community, and practical rationality will also have the same limitations. Therefore, as some scholars admit, the characterization of the formation, function and rationality of moral judgment will ultimately have a certain degree of relativity. In other words, internalism may be compatible with relativism (even an individual relativism). (21) In addition, it is not ruled out that in a certain society, all people are "immoralists" who only make moral judgments and have neither moral motivation nor moral behavior. Therefore, their lives are completely different from ours, and their evaluation of rationality will inevitably be different from ours.

　　Of course, people’s moral life patterns are not the same, and even the contents of moral judgments may conflict with each other, so it is possible that some people use moral judgments in a way that is very different from ours. However, this is not distressing, just like the example given by GE Moore in the Principles of Ethics: Suppose there is a chair next to us, and we all know that “there is a chair here” is true. Of course, there may be a madman who says that this is not a chair, but an elephant. Although we have no way to prove that he is wrong, we can guide him to form the same judgment as us. (22) Similarly, although they are “immoral people” or their understanding of the purpose of moral judgment and the standard of whether they have practical rationality are different from ours, unless we do not intend to interact with each other, once social interaction is carried out and expanded, we can guide them to participate in our moral life and accept the use of our moral judgments. Of course, if we still fail in the end, just like we cannot convince the madman that it is a chair, we can also eliminate such special views by letting him withdraw from meaningful dialogue and discussion. The international community's "rejection" of individual countries from joining the community, and the same social community's punishment of various "deviants" who cannot be reformed by depriving them of the right to participate in political negotiations, are both manifestations of this view in real life.